Ta prolegomena of Alexander's homonoia by Thermos, Elias
   





  Ta prolegomena of Alexander's homonoia
Thermos Elias  
https://doi.org/10.12681/grsr.223
 
  Copyright © 1974 Elias Thermos 
   
  
   
To cite this article:
Thermos, E. (1974). Ta prolegomena of Alexander's homonoia. Επιθεώρηση Κοινωνικών Ερευνών, 21(21-22),
163-172. doi:https://doi.org/10.12681/grsr.223





jjta prolegomena u 





Dr. Elias Thermos SI
raDepartment of Political Science m 
Texas A-M University Jjj 


















The concept of Homonoia was introduced formally 
by Alexander at Opis in 324 B.C. It seems to reflect 
his desire and aim to reconcile and to unite the peo­
ples of East and West into a gigantic oecumenical 
state. Through the method of cultural fusion the 
Hellenic-speaking people and the peoples of the O- 
rient were to become of one mind, ψυχή, and body, 
and to live permanently in peace, harmony and 
ομόνοια.
In my effort to support this particular interpre­
tation of Homonoia, I propose to consider certain 
important factors such as (1) the Pan-Hellenic polit­
ical crisis, (2) the class struggle and social revolu­
tions of the fifth and fourth centuries in the Hel­
lenic world, (3) the attitude of the Greek thinkers 
towards unity and Homonoia, (4) Philip’s drive for 
Pan-Hellenic unity under Macedonian leadership, 
and (5) Alexander’s «ideology», his foreign policy 
and role in history. As such, I believe that these fac­
tors have to be studied and analysed rather carefully 
if a meaningful interpretation is to be assigned to 
Homonoia.
It is the subject of this paper to consider exten­
sively the first four of the above listed factors in an 
effort to examine closely some vital elements com­
posing the background of the Hellenic world during 
the Pre-Alexandrian era, hoping to shed some light 
on Alexander’s relationship to Homonoia. The factor 
concerning Alexander’s relationship to Homonoia 
is reserved for a full examination in a separate 
paper.
the Hellenic political crisis
With the beginning of the Peloponnesian War in 
431 B.C., a crisis of large proportions became vis­
ibly evident in the Greek world. The real roots of 
the crisis seem to go far back to a time before the 
year 431 B.C., and they are mainly associated with 
the states of Athens, Corinth and Sparta. These 
states had established themselves after the Persian 
Wars of 490 and 480-479 B.C. as the dominant forces 
in the Hellenic World and they associated themselves, 
to a differing degree, with imperial interests. The 
ultimate clash of those interests came about in 431 
B.C. when the armed struggle took place between the 
state of Athens and that of Sparta. In these states 
almost the entire Hellenic world participated.
In the decisive head-on collision between the two, 
Athens was totally crushed in 404 B.C.; eventually 
the victors suffered the same fate as that of the 
vanquished. The state of Sparta unwilling and unable 
to maintain a position of total supremacy over the 
Hellenic world was also defeated militarily by Thebes 
in Leuctra in 371 B.C.
The civil conflict which began with the Pelopon­
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nesian War continued after the War for more than 
sixty years. Thus the Hellenic world for almost one 
hundred years was in a deep political crisis which 
destroyed and dissolved important political institu­
tions and signaled the end of the city-state as an 
independent political entity. The long, destructive 
wars had unleashed certain powerful social forces 
and intensified class conflict.
Because some'of these forces were seriously threat­
ening the existing socio-economic structures of the 
Geeek city-states, several members of the Greek 
intelligentsia began to question seriously the validity 
of the systems in the city-states and proposed certain 
alternatives or remedies to the situation. Plato talk­
ed of the problem of the plutocrat and the beggar 
and devised an Ideal State, which could do away with 
economic, political and social conflict and bring 
about ειρήνη, which is the highest good.1 Isocra­
tes warned that since the loss of Sicily to the Bar­
barians, τα δε λοιπά μέρη τών ’Ελλήνων εν τοΐς 
μεγίστοις κινδύνοις εστίν.1 2
Almost all the city-states began to exhibit cer­
tain desires for limited unity during the early part 
of the fourth century. However, the strategy and 
shape through which this association was to be at­
tained became a crucial obstacle. The methodology 
was so diverse as to make any serious attempt ob­
solete from the start. The particular emphasis by 
the various Leagues underlines the issue of the time. 
There were six Amphictionic Leagues in Greece 
during the fourth century:
1. The Amphictionic League which was centered 
around the temple of Poseidon Ogchisto of Veotia.
2. The Amphictionic League centered around the 
temple of Poseidon at Kalavria (today’s Poros).
3. The Amphictionic League of Apollo at Delos, 
otherwise known as the Delian Amphictionic 
League.
4. The Amphictionic League of Poseidon at Trifi- 
lia meeting annually on the grounds of the Temple 
of Poseidon.
5. The Amphictionic League of Apollo in Asia Mi­
nor, made up mainly of the Doric city-states there.
6. The Delphic Amphictionic League having the 
following members: Thessaloi, Veotoi, Doriis, 
Iones, Perraivoi, Magnetes, Locroi, Oitaioi, 
Achaoi, Phokis, Dolopes, Maliis.
The Amphictionic Leagues originated as religious 
unions of different neighboring people (Άμφικτυονία- 
dwellers around) and their functions were limited 
mainly to religious festivals and sacrifices. However, 
the scope, purpose and function of all the Amphi­
ctionic Leagues in general and of the Delphic in
1. Plato, Laws, Book 1.
2. Isocrates, To Philip, 13-17.
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particular changed drastically during the fourth 
century.
The twelve tribes in the Delphic League included 
almost all of the Hellenic people south of Macedonia 
with the exception of the people of southwest Pelo- 
ponnesos and those of Aetolea and Acarnania. 
The Delphic Amphictionic League underwent a rapid 
transformation during the 5th century B.C. be­
coming a foremost institution in Greece striving 
for a political role and symbolizing an eventual 
federation of the city-states.
In the midst of the destructive civil wars the Greeks 
realized that they had exposed themselves to possible 
conquest by the Persians. Already by the Treaty 
of Sousa in 383 B.C. the Persians were regulating 
Greek affairs both east and west of the Aegean Sea. 
The image of the Great Persian King had become 
an element in the political life of the Greeks from 
404-359 B.C. The year 359 B.C. should be taken as 
the turning in the Hellenic thought towards cooper­
ation and unity. By 359 B.C. the following outstand­
ing events had taken place :
1. The Peace of Antalcidas was signed between the 
Spartans and the Persians in 378 B.C. Sparta, fright­
ened by the alliance concluded by the Corinthians, 
the Athenians and the Thebans in 392 B.C., sent their 
king, Antalcidas, to Persia in order to obtain a treaty 
of alliance with the great king. In return for this 
alliance, the Spartans made two tremendously im­
portant concessions to the Persians. First, they 
handed the control of the Hellenic city-states in 
Asia Minor over to the Persians, thus giving up any 
commitment which they had to them for their de­
fense and officially recognized the sovereignty of 
the Persians over these territories and states for 
the first time in history. Second, they agreed for­
mally that all the city-states of Greece should be 
prevented from forming alliances or uniting with 
each other.3 Each city-state should be completely 
independent of the other. Thus the over-all power 
of the Hellenic-speaking people was greatly re­
duced. No longer could the Greeks resist the ambi­
tion and frustrate the plans of the Persian king. He 
was to be left entirely free in dominating the Middle 
East.
2. The city-state of Thebes had risen and fallen. 
Struggling for recognition and a position of domi­
nance in the Hellenic world, Thebes used various 
means, including cooperation and alliance with the 
Persian king against the Greeks, in order to increase 
both her potential strength and her image in the out­
side world. During the Peloponnesian War Thebes 
retreated into the background and watched Athens 
and Sparta destroying each other and along with
3. Albert A. Trever, History of Ancient Civilization, Voi. 1 
(New York: Brace and Company, 1936), pp. 176, 177.
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them a number of other city-states. Finally, her 
turn had to come. On the ruins of the Peloponnesian 
War, Thebes rose as the mighty and invincible state 
of Hellas. Her glory and success depended mainly 
on the ability of two extremely able political and mili­
tary leaders, Pelopidas and Epamenondas.
The rise of Thebes was to bring only disasters and 
war adventures on the suffering peoples of the Greek 
World. A new civil war erupted in 394 B.C. and con­
tinued until 362 B.C. This time the city-states were 
polarized around Sparta and Thebes. Athens re­
treated into a secondary role. Thebes drive for power 
climaxed with the Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C., in 
which the Spartans were crushed, and continued un­
til the Battle of Mantineia in 362 B.C. In Mantineia 
the two mightiest armies of Greece clashed for the 
second time head-on. The outcome of this deadly 
clash was a draw, symbolizing and underlining once 
again the exhaustion of the embattled Hellas.
3. All three city-states, Athens, Sparta and Thebes, 
had risen and fallen. They were tired and exhaust­
ed, and with them all the other major Hellenic 
city-states save Macedonia.
class conflict and social revolutions
During the fifth century the class struggle took 
various forms both within and without the city- 
state. A general mass unrest characterized the century 
with the masses being class-conscious and awakened 
to their power.1 From the years 467 to 457 B.C. 
Athens embarked upon a policy of expansion and 
creation of an empire. Persia had been defeated and 
rolled back in 490, 480, and 479 B.C., and Athens 
had emerged from the Persian wars as the most pow­
erful state in the Mediterranean.
Soon after the Persian Wars, Sparta chose to re­
treat back on her own limited sphere of influence, 
mainly in central, southern, and western Pelopon- 
nesos; she embarked at the same time to a program 
of maximum security recognizing the dangers both 
from within and without. Her policy was based on the 
principle of isolation or limited interaction, while 
maintaining an efficient war machinery for internal 
and external defense.1 2
From the end of the Persian Wars to the beginning 
of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. the policy of 
Sparta, apart from being one of isolation, was also a 
reaction to the Athenian foreign policy. Sparta was 
aware of the Athenian schemes for expansion and 
domination and was invariably reacting to such 
schemes and drives.
1. Charles A. Robinson, Jr., Ancient History from Prehis­
toric Times to the Death of Justinian (New York: Macmillan, 
1951).
2. Trever, pp. 410, 420.
In her aim for establishing a powerful empire, 
Athens realized that the main opposition to such 
motions was to come from Sparta; Thebes, Corinth 
and Megara were powers of secondary importance 
and could not be compared with Sparta in her mil­
itary and economic power.
Because of the vulnerability in the internal struc­
ture of the Spartan system, due primarily on the 
class antagonism between the Helotes, Perioikoi 
on one side, and the Spartan citizens on the other, 
the Spartan leaders refused to embark upon expan­
sionists policies and international adventures, and 
thus they rejected Pausanias’ plan for the creation of 
an international empire. Athens, however, aware of 
this deadly weakness of Sparta, extended her influence 
in practically all the Aegean, Black and Ionian Seas 
and controlled places and states ail the way from 
Byzantium to Sicily.
Thriving commercially due to her empire and the 
individual initiative of her subjects, Athens became 
both economically and militarily powerful, and her 
citizens came to enjoy the highest standards of 
living in the Greek world. Under such conditions, 
the Athenian democracy received strong popular 
support and the tensions of class antagonism were 
by and large diminished.
In Sparta the situation was quite different. Eco­
nomically Sparta was not very much better off after 
the Persian Wars than she had been before them. 
The standards of living remained almost the same 
and no new revenues came into the state, since the 
methods of production did not alter and since Pau- 
sanias’ plan for expansion was voted down.3
In 469 B.C., a violent earthquake shook Sparta 
and the towns around, killing about 20,000 people 
and leaving only five houses standing. During this 
profound natural disaster, the Messenian Helotes 
and Perioikoi found an opportunity for revolution. 
The revolt was finally crushed with the help of the 
troops of Mantineia and Sparta survived the chal­
lenge.4
In 464 B.C., the Thasians revolted against the Athe­
nian exploitation of Mount Pangaeon which yielded 
gold and silver. However, the Athenians imposed 
their rule over the Thasians again, and secured the 
mines.5 By this time, the Athenians had advanced 
greatly as a first rate power and began to treat their 
allies as subjects (βιαίως καί όπερηφάνως ήρχον).6
The Peloponnesian Wars in 431-404 B.C. unleashed 
a number of social forces which brought the class 
struggle out in the open in Athens and intensified
3. Margaret O. Wason, Class Struggle in Ancient Greece, 
(London: Victor Collanez, Ltd., 1947, p. 38).
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it in the other Greek states, in 412 B.C. the Athe­
nian democracy was changed to the Oligarchy of 
Four Flundred.1 A year later a revolution broke 
out in Athens in which the extremely conservative 
group of the Four Hundred was replaced by the gov­
ernment of Five Thousand. Only 5,000 of the Wealth­
iest citizens were allowed freely and actively to 
participate in the decision-making process and in 
the new power structure of the government. By 410 
B.C. the old democracy was restored. In the meantime 
revolutions broke out in other parts of Greece. In 
Kerkyra for example, the masses favored democra­
cy while the rich fought to maintain the oligarchy. 
A serious civil strife and massacre culminated in the 
greatest bloodshed yet.1 2 In Samos the sailors re­
volted and replaced the oligarchy with democracy.3 
Encouraged by this revolution, the people of Athens 
revolted against their oligarchs in order to bring 
back democracy.
In the fourth century the states of Athens, Sparta, 
Thebes and Macedonia continuously tried to se­
cure areas of dominance. The wars which resulted 
from such schemes and struggles, unleashed a new 
breed of social forces and intensified further the class 
war. Some of the highlights of class conflict and 
social revolutions in the fourth century were the 
following:
The Social Revolutions in Peloponnesos, 371 B.C. 
Following the defeat of the armed forces of Sparta 
at Leuctra by the rising might of Thebes in 371 
B.C., a series of social revolutions broke up in these 
states of Peloponnesos which were under the Spartan 
sphere of influence. In Argos, according to Diodo­
rus, στάσις εγένετο called σκυταλισμός which Was 
accompanied by the largest slaughter ever to have 
occurred in Greece.4 In Arcadia about the same time, 
large scale civil war broke out involving pro and anti- 
Spartan factions. The anti-Spartan party came to 
power for a while but the pro-Spartan elements pre­
vailed upon the Lacedaemonians to invade Arca­
dia and to suppress the popular uprising.5
The Social War of358-357 B. C. In 358 B.C. a crisis 
of very large proportions shook the foundations of 
the empire which Athens had managed to put back 
together after her defeat in the Peloponnesian Wars. 
The competition between Thebes and Athens for the 
establishment of spheres of influence in the Aegean 
and in central and northern Greece brought about 
an increasing degree of exploitation for the peoples
1. Diodorus XIII, 38, 1-6.
2. Diodorus ΧΠΙ, 47.5.-48.3.
3. Thucydides Vili, LXX1II. 3-LXXIV.l.
4. Diodorus Book XV, 57.2-58.3.
5. Ibid., Book XV, 59.3-60.3.
in these areas and whose destinies and lots were in 
dispute by Thebes and Athens.
Both Athens and Thebes managed to organize 
their own favored parties in the various states of 
Greece; such was the case in Peloponnesos and in 
other parts of the country where one could find pro- 
Spartan governments and parties during the second 
half of the fifth and fourth century, and so it was the 
case with the Athenians and Thebans during this time. 
As a matter of fact, the leading Greek city-states 
always associated their own immediate security with 
the spread of their own forms of government and 
systems throughout Greece; or if this was not possi­
ble, they tended to support certain functions and par­
ties in the various states which were indentifying 
at least partially with their interests.
In Euboea, an island which traditionally was re­
garded as an Athenian sphere of influence, the The­
bans organized their own party and challenged the 
interests of Athens there. The clash of the Theban 
and Athenian interests in Euboea not only inten­
sified exploitation and stimulated class struggle 
there, but brought about an armed conflict between 
the pro-Athenian and the pro-Theban parties. The 
civil war which began in Euboea was to become 
the spark for revolutions in the entire Athenian 
empire.
The inhabitants of Euboea were involved in a civil 
war. When the parties of the conflict invited foreign 
support, the war spread over the entire island. 
Soon after the Euboean civil war, the Athenians be­
came involved in the Social War against the revolu­
tionaries of Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzantium.6
The city-states of Chios, Rhodes, Cos and Byzan­
tium joined forces immediately and on the land oper­
ations they defeated the Athenian forces which were 
sent to crush the revolutions in Chios led by the gen- 
eralsChares and Chabrias. On the sea operations the 
allied city-states had put together a fleet of one hun­
dred ships in contrast to the sixty ships in the Athe­
nian fleet. The allied fleet conquered most of the 
Athenian positions in the Aegean and placed Athens 
in a very difficult situation. Under these conditions, 
Athens was forced to negotiate with the revolu­
tionaries of Chios, Cos, Byzantium and Rhodes. The 
outcome of the negotiations was a settlement accord­
ing to which the rebellious city-states not only re­
tained their independence but they al so were allowed 
to withdraw from the Athenian League. The indepen­
dence of Byzantium was officially recognized.7
Aggression in Peloponnesos, 352-351 B.C. The de­
feats of Sparta at Leuctra in 371 B.C. and in Man-
6. Diodorus XVI. 7. 1-3.
7. Ibid., Voi. VII, Book XVI, pp. 255, 256, 257.
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tineia in 363 B.C. by the Thebans had exposed the 
fact that Sparta was declining in power and status 
in the Hellenic world, and that perhaps her days as a 
dominant force were over. Fighting hard against 
this seemingly inevitable doom and collapse, Sparta 
decided to bring under her grip all the areas in Pe- 
loponnesos which had traditionally been within her 
sphere of dominance. Some cities in central and south­
ern Peloponnesos had managed to take advantage 
of the weakness of Sparta and to escape from her 
control and even influence. The Arcadians, the 
Tegeans and others even maintained close ties with 
states outside of Peloponnesos, like Thebes and 
Athens.
The aggression of Sparta began first against the 
Megalopolitans. The Lacedaemonians sent their 
army under the command of Archidamus in 352 
B.C. and overran the country of the Megalopolitans. 
To meet this threat, the leaders of Megalopolis 
asked their allies—Argives, Sicyonians and Messe- 
nians—-for military aid. In addition to the aid which 
Megalopolis received from her allies, Thebes sent 
also four and a half thousand troops under the 
leadership of Cephisian.1
It is important to note here the kind of support 
which the Spartans received from the Greek states. 
Indeed, most of the conservative elements came to 
her aid. Lycophron and Peitholaus, the exiled ty­
rants of Pherae along with the Phokians came to aid 
the aggression with a force of about three and a half 
thousand men.
The firm opposition and determination of the 
Megalopolitans and their allies to resist, forced, the 
Spartans to make an armistice with them and to give 
up their schemes of conquests, realizing fully the 
Willingness and determination of the masses to fight 
for their freedom. The forces of reaction which be­
gan to retreat with the decline of the Spartan might 
were now ready to turn their hopes and allegiances 
to the rising new power of the north.
The Role of Macedonia. The rise of Macedonia 
is closely associated with the personal rule of Phi­
lip II. Philip’s main objective was to create an empire 
and to bring all the Greek cities under his control. 
However, he preferred to control Greece through gov­
ernments favorable to him rather than by military 
force. For this reason the cardinal principle of his 
foreign policy was to create pro-Macedonian parties
1. Ibid., Voi. VII, pp. 297, 298, 299. Marcus N. Todd, A 
Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, Vol. li: From 403 
to 323 B.C. (Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1946), pp. 157, 158, 159, 165, 166.
E.L. Hicks and G. F. Hill, Greek Historical Inscriptions 
(Revised Edition, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1901), pp. 249, 
254, 261.
in the various city-states, supporting often unpopu­
lar and conservative elements.2
Philip’s policy was most successful in the northern 
and eastern Greek city-states where the influence of 
Macedonia was great and the «foreign aid» of Philip 
was utilized by the leaders of the pro-Macedonian 
parties efficiently. Many cities were treacherously 
handed over to Philip’s control against the wish 
of their peoples by pro-Macedonian tyrants and their 
mercenaries.3
The struggles of Athens, Sparta, Thebes and Ma­
cedonia to create empires in the fourth century 
coupled with the effects of these struggles, greatly 
strengthened and stimulated the class consciousness 
of the masses in Greece; they made them aware of 
the existing socio-economic conditions and exposed 
class struggle as a primary social force of the 
fourth century, which was expressed mainly in 
terms of the clash of democracy against oligarchy, 
monarchy or tyranny.
the philosophical attitudes towards Homonoia
From the description of the nature and extent of 
the Pan-Hellenic political crisis and social revolu­
tions, certain forces can be readily identified as being 
dominant in shaping the historical trends of the time, 
such as the drive for expansion and creation of em­
pires, class struggle, trends towards regional unity 
or regionalism, decline of the City-State along with 
its ideology and institutions.
By the middle of the fourth century the city-states 
were nearly exhausted from their armed struggles 
and some leaders recognized that the only way out 
of this crisis was a friendly reconciliation and coop­
eration between them. To be sure, they did not think 
in concrete terms of a Pan-Hellenic union but they 
did feel the need for a closer and more meaningful 
cooperation and pacific settlement of disputes. 
The turning point that brought this new attitude 
among the city-states, came immediately after the 
exhaustive battle which they fought in Mantineia in 
363 B.C.4
It looked as if the only logical way out of this cri­
sis was the emergence of a power outside the struc­
ture with an enlightened monarch as the center of 
unity. Such a person could set up an enlightened strong 
personal rule and arrest the forces of decay and di­
sintegration. Already the concept of an enlightened 
monarch as the ultimate savior of the Hellenic world 
in part and the Oikoumene in general was an attrac­
tive idea among the highest Greek intelligentsia and
2. Wason, p. 145.
3. Diodorus, Voi. VII, Book XVI. 37.3-38.2.
4. Diodorus, Voi. VII, Book XV. 98.2-90.2.
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specifically among some philosophers, whose po­
sitions towards the concept of enlightened monarchy 
will be presented here.
Plato, in his Republic, creates a world which is 
based upon a system of ideocracy. Ideocracy consists 
of aristocracy and monarchy.1 He tells us that 
the Greek cities and τώ άνθρωπίνφ γένει, will never 
rest from their evils until oi φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσω- 
σιν εν ταΐς πόλεσιν, fj oi βασιλής τε νυν λεγόμε­
νοι καί δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καί 
ίκανώς, καί τούτο εις ταυ τον ξυμπέση, δύναμίς τε 
πολιτική καί φιλοσοφία, τών δε νυν πορευομένων 
χωρίς εφ’ έκάτερον ai πολλαί φύσεις εξ ανάγκης 
άποκλεισθώσιν, ούκ εστι κακών παύλα... ουδέ αυ­
τή ή πολιτεία μή ποτέ πρότερον φυη τε εις το δυ­
νατόν καί φως ήλιου ϊδη, ήν νΰν λόγφ διεληλύθα- 
μεν.1 2
Plato tells us in Politicus that there is a need for 
an ideal and absolute monarch. Monarchy when 
bound by good written laws, Plato says, is the best 
of all six forms of government. However, without 
law χαλεπή καί βαρύτατη ξυνοικήσαι·3 The phi­
losopher also draws the portrait of the statesman. 
He defines the monarch as being the true statesman 
and defends monarchy as being the best government 
because in monarchy the king rules like a scientific 
ruler4 and possesses perfect knowledge of politi­
cal science.5 6
Plato argues that monarchy offers two great advan­
tages over all other political systems either in theo­
ry or in practice. The first is that monarchy brings 
harmony which he substitutes for equality. The 
second advantage is that monarchy creates a flexible 
government. Plato believes that monarchy is prefer­
able to any other form of government, because only 
in monarchy can one find free play of reason.® The 
rule of a monarch is guided by his reason which is 
personal and thereby flexible. Therefore monarchy 
possessing a strong personal element and flexibility 
becomes a humane system.
The Republic was written by Plato around 383 B.C. 
It accounts for the existent political systems but 
finds none of them attractive or suitable for a natu­
ral, just and flexible form of government.
He proposed that the family institution be changed 
and liberalized. Women should share power and be 
treated as equals, While the society as a whole be 
guarded from internal diseases such as drinking and 
promiscuity. Poets were to be forbidden to circulate
1. Sir Ernest Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and 
Aristotle (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), p. 164.
2. Plato, Republic, Book V, 472 D-E.
3. Plato, Politicus, 302 E
4. Plato, Politicus, 301 Z.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 170.
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verses unless censored by Curators to reflect accu­
rately as the real essense of things, while exportation 
of internal money was forbidden. Private property 
was severely limited. The Monarch in Plato’s thought 
is the necessary social force which can bring ομόνοιαν 
καί φιλίαν among the men of courage and restraint, 
and thus provide for a happy state without conflict.7
Plato substitutes harmony for equality because he 
begins with the assumption that most people are not 
equal by nature and that justice is the freedom of 
individuals to discover the harmony of their na­
ture with the world around them and thus to per­
form the function for which they are best fitted by 
nature. So if harmony is the keynote of the platonic 
system, then once it is established it should always 
be preserved. There can not be a productive social 
system in Plato’s mind unless it is an accurate model 
of the real harmonious order of things that exists 
in the universe and which includes the relationship 
between Man and his environment.
Since the mission of the monarch is to bring 
Homonoia and harmony in the society and to pre­
serve wisely the guidance of the laws, the monarch 
must possess certain outstanding moral, intellectual, 
and physical qualities, in order to fulfill such a 
delicate and difficult task. The wise monarch thus 
must be a charismatic hero, whose outstanding lead­
ership should constitute an important social ele­
ment in the ideal state.
In such a state, Harmony, Homonoia and social 
love are the main bonds which hold the society to­
gether and make the system operational. From the 
harmonious nature of the system, the concept of justice 
emerges. Justice, according to Plato, aims to bring 
happiness to every individual in the society, because 
it demands the expression and fulfillment of the per­
sonality of every individual, which is a dublicate of his 
real nature. This individual nature is in total harmony 
with the harmony that constitutes the fabric in the 
structure of Cosmos. Thus justice can be defined as 
the harmony of the parts in a whole.
Since justice depends entirely on harmony, then 
there can be no justice in the ideal state unless the 
political system of the state is one of harmony, and 
the leaders of that state direct their rule in such a 
way as to promote Homonoia among the citizens, 
thereby eliminating permanently seeds of decay that 
might disturb the harmonious order of things. Pla­
to’s aim was to make all men good, as he conceived 
goodness.8
Homonoia becomes the connecting tissue in the 
Republic, a vital element in creating the psycho­
logical and ideological substructure of the system.
7. Plato, Politicus, 311 C.
8. Freeman, Eugene and David Appel, The Wisdom and 
Ideas of Plato, p. 118.
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It is this so important substructure, dangerously ig­
nored by critics of Plato and neo-platonists, that 
completes the system by bringing spontaneous har­
mony between the rational and irrational natures 
of Man. The human being in the Republic is the uni­
versal Hellene who represents the finest synthesis 
of the best in the human nature. He is a product of 
the liberating and humanizing process that evolved 
from Achilles to Dionysos.
Perhaps more concerned than Plato over the fu­
ture of the Hellenes was the philosopher Isocrates 
(436-338 B.C.). A few years after Plato wrote his 
Republic, Isocrates wrote his Panegiricus in 380 B.C. 
Through this important work we can analyse and 
visualize the old order of Greece. On the full reali­
zation of the nature and magnitude of the Pan-Hel­
lenic crisis, Isocrates sees as salvation a national 
union through 'Ομόνοια.1 His program was to 
be primarily Pan-Hellenic. He wanted to see a real 
unity among the various Hellenic city-states and to 
use this unity for a common cause against the tra­
ditional enemies of the Hellenes, the Persians.1 2
Isocrates was close to being ninety years old when 
Philip was securing his position in Thessaly and was 
getting ready to wage war against the Greeks south 
of Thessaly. The old man sent a number of letters 
to Philip advising him to bring about ομόνοια among 
the Greek city-states and to pay no attention to the 
various orators who were primarily supporting 
their own immediate interests. Isocrates also advised 
Philip to display moderation and persuation in deal­
ing with the Hellenes, μέλλοι yap σοι συμβου- 
λεύειν προστήναι τής των 'Ελλήνων όμονοίας καί 
τής επί τους βαρβάρους στρατείας.3
However, Isocrates limited his ideas only to Greeks, 
without much consideration for the peoples of the 
East whom he called Barbarians, and the people 
of the West who were, according to the Greek thinking, 
even less civilized than the Barbarians.
According to Isocrates, Philip’s mission was to 
bring Homonoia to the Greek lands and to follow 
the steps of the national hero of Hellas. Heracles 
was not only a great warrior but also a man of virtue 
and kindness, essential qualities that must be dis­
played by a king if he is to become a great leader and 
to win immortality.4
The Pan-Hellenic war against the Persians in the 
mind of Isocrates was a historical necessity which 
Was imposed upon the Hellenes by the deadly po­
litical and economic weakness and limitations of 
the city-state, οΰτε yap ειρήνην οϊόν τε βεβαίαν 
άγαγεϊν, ήν μή κοινή τοΐς βαρβάροις πολεμήσωμεν,
1. Isociates, Panegyricus, 173-175.
2. Ibid.
3. Isocrates, To Philip, 13-17.
4. Ibid.
ουθ’ όμονοήσαι τους"Ελληνας, πριν αν καί τάς ώφε- 
λείας εκ των αυτών καί τους κινδύνους προς τους 
αυτούς ποιησώμεθα.5
Isocrates seems to have realized the limitations 
and realities of the classical civilization. The lack 
of other feasible alternatives such as technology, 
communications, political modernization, etc., limited 
the choice of the Hellenes to the goals of national 
unity and a materially motivated war against Persia. 
Τούτων δε γενομένων καί τής απορίας τής περί τον 
βίον ημών άφαιρεθείσης, ... ούκ εστιν όπως ουχ 
όμονοήσομεν καί τάς εύνοιας ό.ληθινας προς ημάς 
αύτους εξομεν.6
Aristotle’s position on unity and instruments of 
unity is considerably different from those of Plato 
and the other Greek contemporary philosophers. 
He is an ardent supporter of the city-state system 
on the grounds that the state is natural and neces­
sary because man is not able to meet his desires 
and protect his interests by himself.7
Unity in Aristotle’s view should be centered around 
the State which is an end in itself and the best govern­
ment for a state would be a synthesis between de­
mocracy and oligarchy. The uniting factor in a society 
of property classes should be the middle class.8
Aristotle sees the middle class as a uniting and 
balancing force in the system. The mission of the mid­
dle class is to fill the gap between the rich and the 
poor, to avoid and nullify a polosis of the two ex­
tremes of the system and as such to arrest and har­
monize all the diversive factions and social forces.9 
Concerning the role and mission of the monarch, 
Aristotle’s position is similar to that of Plato.
Although Plato, like Aristotle, sees the mission of 
the monarch as one of harmonizing and arresting 
the contradictions and conflicts of the forces within 
the system in order to preserve the harmonious order 
of things, he differs from Plato in his belief that the 
King need not be a philosopher king in the platonic 
sense, but rather the king should come from the 
better classes in order to protect them from the 
people.10
In summation, Aristotle believes that the mission­
ary role of the middle class is to be a buffer zone 
between the two antagonistic classes of that of very 
rich and that of very poor and to eliminate or arrest 
social discontent. The missionary role of the mon­
arch is to project himself as a powerful social force 
of arbitration and harmony in the system. Although 
Aristotle associates this principle of supreme virtue
5. Isocrates, Panegyricus, 173-174.
6. Isocrates, Ibid.
7. Tarn, Alexander the Great, Vol II, p. 403.
8. Barker, p. 268.
9. Aristotle, Politics, IV, IX, 6-8.
10. Ibid., IV, X-36.
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with monarchy, his favored political system was one 
which could be based upon the rule of law.
At the same time there was a group of intellectuals 
critical of the existing order and known as Cynics. 
The original meaning of the word Cynic is «doggish­
ness.» Used as a metaphor, it means shameless or 
unabashed, and suggests a negative approach to is­
sues, and from this metaphor cynicism takes its 
meaning.
Cynicism was not a philosophy and did not con­
stitute a separate school of thought as the other 
four Hellenic schools had done with a body of doc­
trine (Platonic, Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic). 
Cynicism was rather a mode of thought, a way of 
life, and its approach was completely negative.1 
απάθειαν yap ποιούνται το τέλος· τοϋτο δε ίσον 
εστί τφ θεόν γενέσθαι.1 2
Cynicism Was highly critical of the cultural behav­
ior and structure of the establishments and it was 
highly individualistic. The Cynics thought always 
of themselves as having no bonds with their immedi­
ate society but rather belonging to the world commu­
nity. They were not, in their hearts, citizens of any 
city-state, but citizens of the world.
When Diogenes (400-325 B.C.), the founder of 
the Cynics, was asked to what city he belonged, he 
answered that he was a cosmopolite, meaning citi­
zen of the World, and thus he had rejected the basis 
and nature of the Greek city-state.3 4
The Cynics had rejected the current systems and 
institutions. They displayed hostility and contempt 
for such things as lineage and fame because they were 
parts of the system and were mere smokescreens to 
conceal the weakness and often bankruptcy of the 
system. The end result and aim of the Cynicism was 
to be natural happiness, το δε ευδαιμονεΐν εν τφ 
ζην κατά φύσιν, άλλα μη προς τάς των πολλών 
δόξας}
Diogenes, Crates and other cynics said much against 
the declining city-state system and exposed its hy­
pocrisy and lack of justice by their negative approach. 
However, Cynicism suggests something more than 
just an approach of a group of people expressing 
their dissatisfaction and disagreement with the sys­
tem. This trend exposes the dimensions of the aliena­
tion in the Hellenic world during the fifth, fourth, 
and third centuries. It expresses also the symptoms 
of decay of the old order. Cynicism was not a formal­
ized movement or a centralized institutionWith her­
itage and concrete aims and plans. It represented 
clearly a mounting dissatisfaction and discontent
1. Tarn, Alexander the Great, Vol. II, p. 404.
2. Julian, The Orations of Julian, VI.
3. Hadas, Moses, Essential Works of Stoicism (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1961), p. x.
4. Julian, The Orations of Julian, VI.
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of many intellectuals with the existing socio-economic 
and political institutions.
As the forces of the Pan-Hellenic crisis were gain­
ing constant impetus, and civil wars were intensi­
fying the crisis, the people turned to material objects 
in the hope of finding a certain amount of secutity and 
happiness in them. As the people of Hellas saw their 
religion and its subsequent value system collapse 
in ruins, and as they were forced to acknowledge bit­
terly the reality of the bankruptcy of their political 
institutions, they turned to other fronts searching 
for happiness. They became selfish, apathetic, more 
individualistic, more demanding. The Stoic concept 
of apathy and the Epicurean concept of anarchy help­
ed to clarify the situation.5
Along with the process of alienation, class con­
flict is exposed and underlined by the existence of 
Cynicism. The Cynics, along with many Stoics, iden­
tified readily with the class struggle and helped to 
create consciousness among the lower classes of city- 
states societies. It was the Stoic Spahros of Borysthe- 
nes, for example, a disciple of Zeno himself, who 
seems to have been the directing force behind Cleo- 
menes’ social revolution in third-century Sparta; 
while a century later another Stoic, Blossius of Cu­
mae, seems to have been responsible for the liberal 
program of the Gracchi.6
The fourth century was in some respects for the 
Hellenic world what the nineteenth century was for 
the Western world. Both centuries witnessed socio­
economic systems collapsing and new ones rising. 
The political changes were similar also in some re­
spects. A number of different schools of thought such 
as the Stoic and Epicurean flourished in the Hellenic 
world during the fourth century. These schools 
had developed various doctrines ranging from Epi­
curean anarchy to the highly ordered system of 
Stoicism. By and large, these new philosophical doc­
trines were concerned with the task of reconciling 
man with the realities of the changing world and with 
suggesting possible paths which he could follow 
in order to continue surviving and developing fur­
ther.
Philip’s drive for Hellenic unity
Philip of Macedonia was born in 382 B.C. At the 
age of twenty-three he was appointed regent to the 
infant son of King Perdiccas who was slain by the 
Illyrians in a war in the northern Macedonia in 359 
B.C. As soon as young Philip was appointed regent, 
the very existence of the state of Macedonia was se-
5. Hadas, Moses, Essential Works of Stoicism (N. Y.: 
Bantam Books, 1961), p. ix.
6. Ibid., p. xi.
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riously threatened by various tribal groups. At once 
the young regent dealt with the Peanians and Illy­
rians with impressive energy and einciency. boon the 
threat was eliminated, thanks to brilliant military 
victories scored by Philip against the enemies. The 
success of Philip convinced the leading people of 
Macedonia that he should become the next king 
rather than Amyntas, the infant son of Perdiccas. 
Thus, as soon as Philip returned to Pella, his army 
and the elite leadership of Macedonia declared 
him king.
Philip displayed from the very beginning an out­
standing character enriched by outstanding qualities 
in the field of war and politics. He was brave to the 
point of recklessness and, as Fuller says, «He pos­
sessed in marked degree the gift of divining what was 
in his enemy’s mind, and when beaten in the field 
would accept defeat and prepare for victory. Through­
out his life he never lost sight of his aim—to bring 
the whole of Greece under his dominion.»1
As soon as Philip secured his northern frontier 
from the Illyrians and Peanians in 359 B.C., he 
proceeded to consolidate his positions in the north, 
thus preparing the way for becoming the master of 
the Balkan Peninsula in the near future. Having suc­
ceeded in bringing unity under Macedonian rule to 
the various tribes residing along the eastern and 
northern frontiers, including the Thracians, he pro­
ceeded to turn his attention to the Greek world. 
From his later actions and plans, there is good rea­
son to believe that Philip had from the very begin­
ning of his reign a plan of Hellenic unity under his 
leadership and that he recognized immediately his 
number-one enemy which had to be overcome if his 
plan was to succeed.
The State of Athens, as Philip saw it, was the great­
est obstacle to his victory because of her tremendous 
naval power. She was the great naval power of Greece 
and she could also become invincible if she could 
reach an understanding with the Persians.1 2 During 
this time Athens was again on the rise. It was to be 
the last ascent of Athens before the eclipse. The A- 
thenian comeback culminated with the Silver Age of 
Lycurgus.3
Beginning with this assumption, Philip proceeded 
to neutralize Athens as much as possible from the 
military standpoint, at the same time he tried to win 
Athenian cooperation and good will. Thus Philip was
1. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great (London’ 
1958).
2. Ibid., p. 25.
3. Fordyce Mitchel, Athens in the Age of Alexander (Greece 
and Rome, October 1965), p. 189. The Silver Age of Lycur­
gus is named after Lycophron, son of Lycurgus. Lycophron 
dominated the politics of Athens for twelve years and his 
accomplishments compare favorably with those of Pericle’s
Golden Age.
holding weapons in one hand and an olive branch in 
the other. Power and diplomacy were to be the main 
two channels followed by Philip in regard to his re­
lations with Athens. A brief account of Philip’s drive 
for the hegemony of Greece is as follows:
In 359 B.C. Philip made a secret treaty with the 
Athenians agreeing that he should seize Pydna for 
himself and that he would conquer Amphipolis 
for them. Soon Philip seized Pydna but Amphipolis 
was not handed over to Athens and instead it was 
handed over to Philip by a pro-Macedonian faction. 
This conquest was to become of paramount impor­
tance because the gold mines of Mount Pangaeon 
produced a revenue of 1,000 talents yearly. These 
new financial sources were comparable to those of 
Athens and Sparta during the height of these powers. 
Philip had secured through the seizure of the mines 
enough financial support to finance his campaign 
for the dominion of Macedonia.4 He also secured 
the timber industry of the same region which was ex­
tremely valuable for his Fleet.
In 358 B.C. Philip took Potidaea and thus almost 
totally expelled the Athenians from their colonies 
and footholds along the Thracian coast. In the same 
year Philip married Olympias, the daughter of Neo- 
ptolemus of Epirus, and thus secured his southwest­
ern frontier. In 355 B.C. the first sacred war broke 
out. The Phokians led by Philomelus had taken 
Delphi and occupied the sacred temple of Apollo 
seizing the treasures and other sacred and extreme­
ly valuable objects. The General Assembly of 
the Delphic Amphictionic League passed a resolu­
tion condemning the action of Phokis and ordering a 
military action against him. War between Phokis 
and the coalition of Veotia, Locris and Thessaly 
broke out in 355 B.C. Philip gladly took advan­
tage of the situation and marched against the Thes­
salians. Defeated twice by the combined strength of 
the Phokians and Thessalians, he retreated, but in 
352 B.C. he came back and managed to win the Thes­
salians by diplomacy. The Phokian army was de­
feated; by occupying Pherae the control of the whole 
of Thessaly was under the Macedonians. In 344 B.C. 
Philip was appointed the tagus or ruler of Thessaly 
for life.
In 339 B.C. the second sacred war broke out, this 
time between the Locrians of Amphissa and the mem­
bers of the Amphictionic League, led by Thebes 
and Athens. Because both Thebes and Athens failed 
to fulfill their obligations to the Amphictionic Coun­
cil by using their might against the Locrians, the 
Council turned to Philip for support. Philip gladly 
accepted the responsibility and in 338 he led an
4. G.T. Griffith, The Macedonian Background (Greece and 
Rome, Oct. 1965), p. 127.
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army of 30,000 on foot and 2,000 on horse south 
of the key pass of Thermopylae. The Athenians, 
alarmed, concluded a military alliance with the The­
bans and marched their armies to Chaeronea to 
stop Philip. The battle of Chaeronea was a decisive 
one. The Macedonians triumphed over the allies. 
The Macedonian victory established Macedonia 
as the supreme power in the Hellenic world with Phi­
lip as the undisputed leader.
Master in the technique of winning both war and 
peace, Philip proceeded to deal with the vanquished. 
He severely punished the Thebans and generously 
treated the Athenians. Following the general lines 
of Isocrates’ Pan-Hellenic program, Philip sent his 
son, Alexander, with a top general Antipater to 
Athens bearing with them generous peace proposals 
and the ashes of the Athenian soldiers who had 
fallen at Chaeronea; the Athenian prisoners of war 
were also set free. Alexander offered to the Athe­
nians to become an ally of Philip, to join the pro­
posed National Council, to remain internally auto­
nomous and free and to retain possessions in Samos, 
Delos, Lemmos and Imbros, relinquishing, however, 
her hegemony over the Aegean Empire.1
The Athenians were pleased at least on the sur­
face,1 2 with the terms of the treaty offered to them 
by Philip and in return they granted Attic citizen­
ship to Philip and his son and erected a statue of 
Philip in their Agora.
Now Philip began to construct the New Order of
1. Wheeler, Benjamin Ide, Alexander the Great. The 
Merging of East and West in Universal History (New York: 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1900), p. 72.
2. Fordyce Mitchel (Greece and Rome, October 1965, p.
189) says that the whole affair was «a gloomy and inauspicious 
encounter.» However the Athenians must have been surprised 
with the generous and unprecedented treatment which they
received from their victors.
Greece on the ruins of the old.3 Invitations were 
issued to all the Hellenic states to send represen­
tatives to Corinth in order to consult with him on the 
creation of a Synhedrion, or Federal Council. All 
the Hellenic states responded with the exception of 
Sparta. The first Pan-Hellenic Congress met at 
Corinth in 338 B.C. for the purpose of formally or­
ganizing a new Empire. Interstate peace and free­
dom of commerce constituted its basis. The repre­
sentation of the State of the Synhedrion was estab­
lished in proportion to their military might.4 The 
terms of agreement for a universal peace reached 
at the first Pan-Hellenic Synhedrion at Corinth 
at the end of the year 338 B.C. provided for: perma­
nent peace between Macedonia and the League, 
collective security for external and internal aggres­
sion against the government of any member state, 
Philip was to be the hegemon over the League 
forces for life and was charged with the duty to 
conduct in the immediate future a Pan-Hellenic 
war against the Persians; the Delphic Amphictionic 
Council was appointed to be the supreme judicial 
of the League.
Thus Philip’s drive for limited unity had born 
fruit. For the first time in the entire history of the 
Hellenic world, real foundations for an effective 
unity had been laid. Philip must also be accredited 
for the organization and development of the most 
advanced and efficient military machine up to his 
time. Under the remarkable leadership of Alexander 
and his generals, this formidable manpower weapon 
became, eventually, a key factor in the submission 
of the Near and Middle East to the thrust of Mac­
edonia. Philip’s great achievements opened Alexan­
der’s road towards the Oikoumene.
3. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander the Great (Lon­
don, 1958), p. 36.
4. Ibid.
Έστι δή όμόνοια όταν περί τοΟ άρχειν καί άρχεσθαι ή αύτή προαίρεσις ή, μή τοϋ έκάτερον, 
αλλά του τον αυτόν, καί εστιν ή όμόνοια φιλία πολιτική.
Aristotle, Athenian Constitution Eudemian Ethics on Virtues and Vices. Loeb VII, VII, 7-VIII 5.
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